UNIFORM CIVIL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INTIMATE IMAGES ACT

drafted by the

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS

and by it

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at its

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WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND COMMENTS

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## Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act

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The Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act addresses an increasingly common form of abuse that can cause severe and often irreversible harm: the disclosure of private, sexually explicit images without consent. Much of the abuse is carried out electronically through internet websites, social media, email, or text messages, making it an interstate problem that is particularly suited for treatment by uniform state laws. This act provides a uniform, comprehensive, clear, fair, and constitutionally sound definition of this harmful conduct and remedies for the harm it causes.

Some intimate images disclosed without consent were originally created with consent or obtained within a confidential relationship. In other cases, the images were originally created or obtained without consent through surreptitious recording devices or other forms of voyeurism, or through theft, computer hacking, coercion, bribery, fraud, or force.

Intimate images are disclosed without the depicted individual’s consent for a variety of reasons. Some are disclosed for recreation or profit, without any purpose to harm the depicted individual. Others are disclosed as part of an effort to control, punish, extort, or otherwise inflict harm on current or former intimate partners. Some disclosers seek to destroy the reputation of professional or personal rivals; others attempt to discourage victims of domestic violence or sexual assault from reporting abuse. No matter what the source of the image or purpose of the disclosure, unauthorized disclosures of intimate images occur with surprising frequency.1

The exposure of intimate images can wreak havoc on an individual’s personal, professional, educational, and family life.2 Once an intimate image of a victim is made available on a website or social media platform, it can become accessible to anyone with internet access, any of whom could download, forward, share, and copy it within seconds. A single image can quickly dominate the first several pages of internet search engine results for a victim’s name, reducing the victim's online reputation to a scroll of salacious links. Intimate images are

1 According to a recent nationally representative study, one in eight adult social media users has been victimized or threatened with the unauthorized distribution of private, sexually explicit images or videos. Asia A. Eaton et al., 2017 Nationwide Online Study of Nonconsensual Porn Victimization and Perpetration: A Summary Report 11 (CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, June, 2017). See also DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., NONCONSENSUAL IMAGE SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF “REVENGE PORN” 4 (2016) (using a narrower definition of victimization requiring a nude or near-nude depiction with the intent to hurt or embarrass).

2 See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and Webpages: Creating a Legal Remedy for Victims of Porn 2.0, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 9 (2009); United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 2014).
sometimes directly transmitted to the victim’s family, employers, co-workers, and peers through email, text message, and other means.

Unauthorized disclosures frequently cause emotional distress as well as depression, anxiety, agoraphobia, difficulty maintaining intimate relationships, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Some victims have been stalked, harassed, threatened with sexual assault, defamed as sexual predators, terminated from employment, expelled from their schools, or forced to change their names. Some victims have committed suicide. As evidenced by profit-seeking “revenge porn” websites and the surreptitious exchange of photos on social media platforms, technology has greatly facilitated the demand for and access to this content.

Considerable progress has been made to address this problem through criminal legislation. Beginning in 2013, many state legislatures enacted specific criminal prohibitions aimed at addressing this problem. As of January 2019, forty-two states and the District of Columbia had such laws.

While criminal law can serve as an important deterrent and expression of social condemnation, civil law is better suited to compensate victims for the harm they have suffered. However, existing civil remedies, such as copyright, invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, are often insufficient to address the problem. While copyright claims can provide partial relief in some cases, these claims are available only to victims who created the images themselves. The elements of invasion of privacy tort actions vary from state to state, and, because the disclosures transcend state borders, victims frequently have little sense of whether and how such actions may apply to their experiences. Because negligent tort actions usually require physical harm, such actions are of little help where the harm suffered is emotional distress. Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims often fail due to the vagueness of the standard of “extreme outrageous conduct.”

Accordingly, a specific civil remedy for this form of harm is desirable. By December 2018, only a dozen or so states had enacted legislation to provide a civil remedy. These civil remedies differ considerably in their definitions, scope, effectiveness, remedies, and constitutional implications. This lack of uniformity, especially in light of the borderless nature of the disclosures, creates confusion and inefficiency and leaves victims without a clear means to stop the harm or seek redress. A uniform law will provide victims and disclosers with a uniform remedy and defense.

Despite the desire for uniformity, this act defers to state statutes and court rules where there is already a well-developed body of law. For example, this act defers to state law on the use of a pseudonym by a plaintiff in a civil action and on whether an action survives the death of the

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4 See Mary Anne Franks, Revenge Porn Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV 1251 (2017).
5 See id at 1259.
harmed individual.

Like many existing privacy laws, this act applies only to sensitive content created or obtained under circumstances in which the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Also similar to existing privacy laws, the act includes limited exceptions for certain disclosures, including those made in the course of law enforcement, legal proceedings or education, medical treatment, or investigations of misconduct. This act also includes an exception for disclosures relating to matters of public concern or public interest and disclosures reasonably intended to assist the victim. The act further notes federal statutory limitations on the liability of providers and users of interactive computer services. The act is narrowly drafted to avoid imposing liability on a discloser who lacks the requisite awareness of any of these elements: (1) that the image was created or obtained under circumstances in which the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy or that the image was obtained through theft, bribery, false pretenses, voyeurism, or other wrongful acts, (2) that the individual shown in the image did not consent to the disclosure, or (3) that the individual shown was identifiable.

Existing state and federal laws protect the right of individuals to keep a wide array of private information out of the public eye, including medical records, social security numbers, student educational records, drivers’ license information, genetic information, biometric data, geolocation data, and even video rental information. Some of these laws are very broad in scope, some impose serious criminal as well as civil penalties, and many permit the imposition of liability based on negligence as well as recklessness, knowledge, and purpose. This act recognizes that sexually explicit imagery is a form of private information deserving of similar protection.
UNIFORM CIVIL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
OF INTIMATE IMAGES ACT

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Civil Remedies

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:

(1) “Consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary authorization by an individual
with legal capacity to give authorization.

(2) “Depicted individual” means an individual whose body is shown in whole or in part
in an intimate image.

(3) “Disclosure” means transfer, publication, or distribution to another person. “Disclose”
has a corresponding meaning.

(4) “Identifiable” means recognizable by a person other than the depicted individual:

   (A) from an intimate image itself; or

   (B) from an intimate image and identifying characteristic displayed in connection
       with the intimate image.

(5) “Identifying characteristic” means information that may be used to identify a depicted
individual.

(6) “Individual” means a human being.

(7) “Intimate image” means a photograph, film, video recording, or other similar medium
that shows:

   (A) the uncovered genitals, pubic area, anus, or female post-pubescent nipple of a
       depicted individual; or

   (B) a depicted individual engaging in or being subjected to sexual conduct.

(8) “Person” means an individual, estate, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation,
government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.

(9) “Sexual conduct” includes:

(A) masturbation;

(B) genital, anal, or oral sex;

(C) sexual penetration of, or with, an object;

(D) bestiality; or

(E) the transfer of semen onto a depicted individual.

Comment

The definition of consent as “affirmative, conscious, and voluntary authorization” makes clear that consent cannot be tacit or coerced. While consent need not be in writing, it cannot be inferred solely from silence or lack of protest.

Consent must be given “by an individual with legal capacity to give authorization.” This clarifies that individuals without the requisite legal decision-making capacity cannot consent to the disclosure of their intimate images. The laws of each state regarding legal capacity will determine which individuals are capable of giving consent under the act.

Consent is also context-specific. For example, consent to disclose an intimate image to an intimate partner is not consent to disclose to others, or to the general public. “There is an obvious and substantial difference between the disclosure of private facts to an individual—a disclosure that is selective and based on a judgment as to whether knowledge by that person would be felt to be objectionable—and the disclosure of the same facts to the public at large.” Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 1975).

“Identifying characteristics” can include the depicted individual’s face, birthmarks, tattoos, or other physical identifiers.

“Individual” is meant to be distinguished from the broader definition of “person,” which includes non-human entities.

The definition of “intimate image” is limited to an actual visual representation of an individual, such as a photograph, video, and other similar forms of reproduction. It does not include a painting, drawing, or other figurative representation. While such representations are also capable of causing harm, the harm is of a different nature than the privacy harm this act aims to address. Where appropriate, such representations may be addressed by existing causes of action such as defamation, false light, misappropriation of image, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The word “uncovered” in the definition of “intimate image” in paragraph (7)(A) means visible, that is, not obscured by clothing, censor bars, or similar coverings. The list of body parts in paragraph (7)(A)—genitals, pubic area, anus, or female post-pubescent nipple—does not include every part of the body that might be considered intimate. Many consider the buttocks and parts of the female breast other than the nipple to be intimate parts of the body, but as it is not uncommon for buttocks and parts of the female breast other than the nipple to be displayed in public (for example, at beaches and nightclubs), the definition of “intimate image” is purposefully restricted here.

SECTION 3. CIVIL ACTION.

(a) In this section:

(1) “Harm” includes physical harm, economic harm, and emotional distress whether or not accompanied by physical or economic harm.

(2) “Private” means:

(A) created or obtained under circumstances in which a depicted individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy; or

(B) made accessible through [theft, bribery, extortion, fraud, false pretenses, voyeurism, or exceeding authorized access to an account, message, file, device, resource, or property].

(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 4, a depicted individual who is identifiable and who suffers harm from a person’s intentional disclosure or threatened disclosure of an intimate image that was private without the depicted individual’s consent has a cause of action against the person if the person knew [or acted with reckless disregard for whether]:

(1) the depicted individual did not consent to the disclosure;

(2) the intimate image was private; and

(3) the depicted individual was identifiable.

(c) The following conduct by a depicted individual does not establish by itself that the individual consented to the disclosure of the intimate image which is the subject of an action
under this [act] or that the individual lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy:

(1) consent to creation of the image; or

(2) previous consensual disclosure of the image.

(d) A depicted individual who does not consent to the sexual conduct or uncovering of the part of the body depicted in an intimate image of the individual retains a reasonable expectation of privacy even if the image was created when the individual was in a public place.

**Legislative Note:** A state should insert appropriate terms under state statutes for the terms in subsection (a)(2)(B).

**Comment**

Like many other privacy laws, this act is concerned with the unauthorized disclosure of private information. Various state and federal laws protect the right of individuals to keep a wide array of private information out of the public eye, including copyrighted material, trade secrets, medical records, social security numbers, student educational records, drivers’ license information, genetic information, biometric data, geolocation data, and even video rental information. Some of these laws are very broad in scope; some impose serious criminal as well as civil penalties. This act provides civil remedies for the unauthorized disclosure of another important type of private information—intimate images.

The elements giving rise to liability under this act are:
(1) an intentional disclosure or threat to disclose;
(2) a private;
(3) intimate image;
(4) of an identifiable individual;
(5) without the consent of the depicted individual;
(6) by a person who has the requisite awareness that:
   (a) the depicted individual did not consent to the disclosure,
   (b) the intimate image was private, and
   (c) the depicted individual was identifiable; and
(7) the disclosure harms the depicted individual.

Two options for the requisite awareness that may give rise to civil liability are offered in the act: (1) the discloser knew or (2) the discloser knew or acted with reckless disregard.

An image is “private” under subsection (a)(2)(A) if the individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” A reasonable expectation of privacy is fact specific. An intimate image created by a photograph taken on a public nude beach or at a topless demonstration on Fifth Avenue is not obtained under circumstances in which the depicted individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy, while a photograph taken surreptitiously of a naked person entering the
shower in her own home or other private location would be. Similarly, a depicted individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a topless selfie (self-taken photograph) sent confidentially by the depicted individual to the depicted individual's intimate partner. If that image is disclosed by the intimate partner to another person without the depicted individual’s consent, the disclosure is actionable under this section if the other elements of subsection (b) are met.

The definition of harm in subsection (a)(1) recognizes a broad range of harms. Harm can be physical, as when the disclosure of the intimate images leads to sexual or other physical assault. Harm can also be economic, in the form of job loss, relocation costs, legal fees, and the costs of psychological counseling or therapy. Harm can also include emotional distress and psychological harm, including agoraphobia, anxiety, depression, difficulty maintaining intimate relationships, suicidal ideation, and post-traumatic stress, stemming either directly from the disclosure or indirectly from the stalking and harassment that sometimes follow in its wake.

Subsection (b) provides that disclosing persons are liable if they “knew (1) the depicted individual did not consent to the disclosure; (2) the intimate image was private; and (3) the depicted individual was identifiable.” An alternative mental awareness standard is provided for a state which desires broader coverage under this act. Under this alternative standard, a disclosing person could be liable even if the discloser did not “know” the above three elements were present, but knew enough facts that in disclosing the image, the discloser “acted with reckless disregard for whether” the three elements were met. The phrase “reckless disregard” has been interpreted in the context of defamation as meaning “in fact entertained serious doubts,” and its use in the act is meant to incorporate that interpretation. See St. Amant v. Thompson 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). To meet this standard, the discloser must in fact have serious doubts about consent, privacy, and identifiability.

Under either mental awareness standard, this act should survive constitutional challenge. While subsection (b) regulates images that may be generally protected by the First Amendment as a form of speech (see United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813-814 (2000) (pictures); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (video games)), the United States Supreme Court has never suggested that privacy laws as such, even privacy laws that impose liability on the basis of a lesser mental awareness standard than provided in this act, violate the First Amendment. See Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is ( Mostly) Constitutional, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1501, 1505 (2015) (noting that “[d]espite calls from industry groups and a few isolated academics that these laws somehow menace free public debate, the vast majority of information privacy law is constitutional under ordinary settled understandings of the First Amendment”). However, no matter how carefully crafted, any statute regulating speech can be challenged on First Amendment grounds. As a result, a state assumes some risk that it may incur costs in defending the act against constitutional challenges and, if all or part of the act is struck down, the costs of those challenging the act as well. The “knew or acted with reckless disregard for whether” standard would allow redress for more forms of harmful conduct, but it would also increase the risk to an enacting state that the act might be challenged and that all or part of the act may be struck down as unconstitutional. Our analysis is that under current Supreme Court precedent, the “acted with reckless disregard for whether” language is constitutional.
Subsection (d) addresses situations where the intimate image is created in a public place, but where the depicted individual had no control over the intimate nature of the image. Examples include situations such as when an injured party’s clothes are torn from her body in a car accident, a person’s dress is forcibly yanked down in public without her consent, or a sexual assault is committed in a public space.

Finally, this act does not address the issue of whether a cause of action under the act survives the death of the depicted individual. That issue is left to other applicable state law.

**SECTION 4. EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY.**

(a) In this section:

(1) “Child” means an unemancipated individual who is less than 18 years of age.

(2) “Parent” means an individual recognized as a parent under law of this state other than this act.

(b) A person is not liable under this act if the person proves that disclosure of, or a threat to disclose, an intimate image was:

(1) made in good faith in:
   
   (A) law enforcement;
   
   (B) a legal proceeding; or
   
   (C) medical education or treatment;

(2) made in good faith in the reporting or investigation of:

   (A) unlawful conduct; or
   
   (B) unsolicited and unwelcome conduct;

(3) related to a matter of public concern or public interest; or

(4) reasonably intended to assist the depicted individual.

(c) Subject to subsection (d), a defendant who is a parent, legal guardian, or [individual with legal custody] of a child is not liable under this act for a disclosure or threatened disclosure of an intimate image, as defined in Section 2(7)(A), of the child.
(d) If a defendant asserts an exception to liability under subsection (c), the exception does not apply if the plaintiff proves the disclosure was:

(1) prohibited by law other than this [act]; or

(2) made for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, humiliation, degradation, or monetary or commercial gain.

(e) Disclosure of, or a threat to disclose, an intimate image is not a matter of public concern or public interest solely because the depicted individual is a public figure.

Legislative Note: In subsection (c), a state should insert the appropriate term for an individual with legal custody other than a parent.

Comment

Section 4(b)(1) and (2) make an exception for good faith reporting of wrongful conduct. Subsection (b)(1) permits disclosure in connection with law enforcement, a legal proceeding, or medical education or treatment. Subsection (b)(2) permits disclosure to facilitate investigation of unlawful or unsolicited and unwelcome conduct. For example, an employee who received an otherwise protected image from a harassing supervisor would not be liable under this act for forwarding the image to the company’s human relations department.

Subsection (b)(3) makes an exception for matters of “public concern or public interest.” Subsection (e) clarifies that an intimate image does not fall within this exception solely because the depicted individual is a public figure.

The “public concern” exception is intended to ensure compliance with the First Amendment. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that “matters of public concern” are “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection” while “speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.” 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (quoting First Nat ‘l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). While the dividing line between the two is not crystal clear, this exception provides the courts with an opportunity to determine the level of First Amendment protection through an independent and detailed examination of the content, form, and context of the speech as revealed by the whole record. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452, 454 (2011).

In subsection (d)(1), “prohibited by law other than this act” refers to federal and state laws regarding child exploitation and pornography that may apply to the disclosure.
SECTION 5. PLAINTIFF’S PRIVACY.

Alternative A

In an action under this [act] a plaintiff may proceed using a pseudonym in place of the true name of the plaintiff under [applicable state law or procedural rule].

Alternative B

In an action under this [act]:

(1) the court may exclude or redact from all pleadings and documents filed in the action other identifying characteristics of the plaintiff under [applicable state law or procedural rule];

(2) a plaintiff to whom paragraph (1) applies shall file with the court and serve on the defendant a confidential information form that includes the excluded or redacted plaintiff’s name and other identifying characteristics; and

(3) the court may make further orders as necessary to protect the identity and privacy of a plaintiff).

End of Alternatives

Legislative Note: If a state’s rules of civil procedure do not provide for the possibility of a plaintiff to use a pseudonym in a civil action, use Alternative B.

Comment

The fear of further notoriety or abuse deters many victims from pursuing legal remedies. This fear can be mitigated by clear procedures allowing victims to use pseudonyms. Recognizing that some procedures already exist and vary widely among states, this section leaves the particulars of the process to other applicable state law.

SECTION 6. REMEDIES.

(a) In an action under this [act], a prevailing plaintiff may recover:

(1) the greater of:

(A) economic and noneconomic damages proximately caused by the
defendant’s disclosure or threatened disclosure, including damages for emotional distress
whether or not accompanied by other damages; or

(B) statutory damages not to exceed $10,000 against each defendant
found liable under this [act] for all disclosures and threatened disclosures by the defendant of
which the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known when filing the action or which
became known during the pendency of the action. In determining the amount of statutory
damages under subsection (a)(1)(B), consideration must be given to the age of the parties at the
time of the disclosure or threatened disclosure, the number of disclosures or threatened
disclosures made by the defendant, the breadth of distribution of the image by the defendant, and
other exacerbating or mitigating factors;

(2) an amount equal to any monetary gain made by the defendant from disclosure
of the intimate image; and

(3) punitive damages [as allowed under law of this state other than this [act]].

(b) In an action under this [act], the court may award a prevailing plaintiff:

(1) reasonable attorney’s fees[ and costs]; and

(2) additional relief, including injunctive relief.

(c) This [act] does not affect a right or remedy available under law of this state other than
this [act].

Legislative Note: A state should include the reference to costs in subsection (c)(1) if other state
law does not provide for recovery of costs.

Comment

Many victims are deterred from initiating legal action by the psychological toll and the
financial cost of litigation. Victims of privacy invasions, especially those involving nudity or
sexual activity, are often reluctant to subject themselves to further exposure through the court
system. Victims of sexual abuse often find the prospect of having to recount their experiences in
detail traumatizing. What is more, the process of seeking legal redress often forces victims to
confront negative, judgmental, and malicious attitudes, resulting in what is often referred to as the “secondary victimization” of sexual abuse victims.

Providing the possibility of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs will encourage victims who could not otherwise sustain the financial burden of litigation to seek a civil remedy. The possibility of statutory damages provides an opportunity for victims to recover for harms they have suffered without requiring them to testify in invasive detail about those harms.

The statutory damages provision is unusual in that it suggests a range of damages rather than a fixed amount, and is limited to one statutory recovery for all disclosures by the defendant occurring within a certain time period. This is due to the unique nature of the problem addressed by this act. Technology makes it possible for the number of unauthorized disclosures of intimate images to range in the thousands, even millions. This potential for vast proliferation makes it advisable to establish upper and lower boundaries. The range recommended in the provision is meant to balance the policy concerns of redress for the plaintiff and fairness to the defendant. Because the statutory damages are a range rather than a fixed amount, subsection (a)(1)(B) requires the consideration of several factors to determine the appropriate amount.

“Gain” in this section means net gain. For example, if a discloser spends $1,000 to create and disclose an image in violation of this act and earns $10,000 from this disclosure, the net gain is $9,000.

SECTION 7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

(a) An action under Section 3(b) for:

(1) an unauthorized disclosure may not be brought later than [four] years from the date the disclosure was discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and

(2) a threat to disclose may not be brought later than [four] years from the date of the threat to disclose.

(b) [Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), this] [This] section is subject to [the tolling statutes of this state].

[(c) In an action under Section 3(b) by a depicted individual who was a minor on the date of the disclosure or threat to disclose, the time specified in subsection (a) does not begin to run until the depicted individual attains the age of majority.]
Legislative Note: A state should include subsection (c) if other state law does not provide an applicable tolling provision for minors.

Comment

The nature of internet communication complicates the determination of an appropriate statute of limitations for the unauthorized disclosure of intimate images. While some victims are quickly made aware of the defendant’s disclosure of their intimate images, many victims do not discover the disclosure for a long period of time. The images may be distributed on websites or social media platforms not visited by the victim, or they may be sent to someone the victim does not know. Thus, many years could pass before a victim discovers the unauthorized disclosure or suffers harm. In addition, even after discovering the disclosure, a reasonable person might not initially bring suit because of the resulting emotional trauma, the fear that bringing suit will bring more attention to the existence of the images, the costs and risks of litigation, and the hope that the disclosure might not receive a great amount of attention.

The statute of limitations balances these concerns with the public interest in promoting prompt filing of claims to allow parties to access relevant evidence and mitigate damages.

SECTION 8. CONSTRUCTION.

[(a)] This [act] must be construed to be consistent with the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. Section 230.

[(b) This [act] may not be construed to alter the law of this state on [sovereign] immunity.]

Legislative Note: If a state includes subsection (b), a state that requires a statutory reference to sovereign immunity or governmental immunity should include the reference.

Comment

This section emphasizes that Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act (CDA) may preempt certain state law claims. Section 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Section 230(c)(2) prohibits holding providers or users of interactive computer services civilly liable on the basis of good faith restrictions in accessing objectionable material or for making information about the technical means of restricting access to such material. Section 230(e)(3) provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”
SECTION 9. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION. In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

[SECTION 10. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this [act] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this [act] which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [act] are severable.]

Legislative Note: Include this section only if this state lacks a general severability statute or a decision by the highest court of this state stating a general rule of severability.

SECTION 11. REPEALS; CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) . . .

(b) . . .

(c) . . .

SECTION 12. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect . . .